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WHAT IS OPTIONAL IN THE 
FULFILLMENT OF DUTY? 
Gregory Mellema 
Moral duties are often described in terms of rigid requirements to perform, or refrain 
from performing, actions of certain specific types. In various theological traditions this 
point is often expressed in terms of the demands God places upon His creatures. However, 
there are several important ways, as Kant, Mill, and others have noted, in which the 
fulfillment of duty admits of options. In this paper an effort is made to offer a precise 
characterization of these ways. On this basis it is concluded that many duties are not of 
the form in which duties are commonly characterized. 
Moral duties are often described in terms of rigid requirements to perform, or 
refrain from performing, actions of certain specific types. If one has a duty to 
perform such actions, then that is exactly what one must do. To do anything 
else, strictly speaking, constitutes a failure to fulfill the duty. "Moral precepts," 
according to Emile Durkheim, "demand of us certain specific behavior.'" 
In various theological traditions this point is often expressed in terms of the 
demands God places upon His creatures. God demands of His creatures that they 
perform, or refrain from performing, actions of certain specific types. These 
God-given duties, it is generally urged, playa highly significant role in the lives 
of believers. Because people often look for ways to escape their duties, it is 
often felt important to stress the specificity of our God-given duties. In particular, 
it is judged necessary within these traditions to stress this point to children and 
new converts. Because our God-given duties are depicted as requirements of a 
specific nature, believers can be made aware that there are definite expectations 
which apply to them. 
Here I shall urge that, in spite of the significance of such duties in the lives 
of believers, it is by no means essential to the concept of duty to embody such 
requirements. While there are many duties which can be fulfilled or discharged 
only by performing actions of certain specific types, there are a great many 
duties whose fulfillment admits of options of various types. The recognition that 
there are such duties is, of course, by no means novel. Kant acknowledged, for 
example, that there are certain duties which agents are free to fulfill when they 
choose to do so. I believe Kant is entirely correct on this matter. My aim in 
whal follows, however, will be to distinguish several important ways in which 
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it is possible for the fulfillment of duty to involve elements of what is optional. 
I will attempt to offer a precise characterization of these ways, as well as examples 
of each, and in so doing I hope to make clear that the "imperfect" duties of Kant 
comprise only one class of duties whose fulfillment admits of options. 
I . Basic Duties 
The first class of duties I shall discuss is typified by the following version of 
act utilitarianism: "Every agent ought to act in every circumstance so as to bring 
about the greatest benefits for the greatest number." For every person, no matter 
who, in any circumstance, no matter what, there is something the person has a 
duty to do, namely, whatever is necessary to bring about the greatest benefits 
for the greatest number. To fail to do this is, ipso facto, to fail to fulfill one's 
duty. Each person has a requirement to do whatever is necessary to bring about 
the greatest benefits to the greatest number. 
Duties of this type I shall call 'Basic Duties.' A duty qualifies as a basic duty, 
as I shall employ the term, just in case it is of the form: 
(I) Every agent ought to do whatever is necessary in order to bring 
about outcome 0 whenever in circumstances of type C2. 
An example of a basic duty can be seen by imagining that George is standing 
idly on the beach when a swimmer in the process of drowning begins calling 
for help. Suppose that no one else is present, that George is skilled in the 
techniques of rescuing persons who are drowning, and that there are no unusual 
risks involved in attempting to rescue the individual in this situation. Surely it 
is plausible to say that George has a moral duty to rescue the swimmer in distress. 
If so, his duty is a basic duty, for he is in circumstances such that any moral 
agent in relevantly similar circumstances ought to do the same thing. Naturally, 
these are not the only circumstances in which one ought to rescue swimmers in 
distress. But it is clear that his duty is a basic duty, for whenever one is in such 
circumstances, one has a duty to do whatever is necessary to come to the rescue 
of the swimmer. 
There are three features of basic duties which will tum out to be of significance 
in the following discussion. First, basic duties apply to every moral agent without 
exception. Anyone in circumstances relevantly similar to those of George has 
the same duty. Second, basic duties apply to every occasion in which moral 
agents are in circumstances of type C. No matter how many times George finds 
himself in relevantly similar circumstances, he has the same duty. Third, basic 
duties apply to every element or portion of an agent's effort required to bring 
about outcome O. George must perform a series of actions in order to rescue 
the drowning swimmer, and the entire series of actions falls within the scope of 
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this duty. By perfonning only some of these actions, but not enough to complete 
the rescue, George fails to fulfill it. 
Notice that what counts as a 'circumstance' includes not only states of affairs 
such as the swimmer's calling for help or there being no one else present, but 
it includes such states of affairs as the agent's possessing certain qualities or 
properties. Were George not able to rescue swimmers in distress, then, on the 
present account, his circumstances would be relevantly different. It may seem 
odd to describe George's ability to rescue swimmers in distress as one of the 
circumstances in which he finds himself, but I shall nevertheless employ the 
tenn in this manner. Also included among George's circumstances, finally, is 
the state of affairs of George's having no overriding duties. George's duty, 
therefore, will be understood to be what philosophers call an 'all-things-consi-
dered-duty,' and the same will be assumed in subsequent examples. 
It might appear as though (1) is formulated in such a way as to place too 
heavy an emphasis upon the outcome or consequences of what agents ought to 
do. According to (1) there must be an outcome 0 towards which one ought to 
direct one's efforts. Thus, it might appear as though (1) leaves no room for 
duties requiring that an agent perfonn an action A regardless of the consequences 
of perfonning A. However, my use of the notion of 'outcome' is intended to be 
wide enough so as to include such duties. Outcome 0 can simply be taken as 
the state of affairs that the agent perfonn action A, and hence there can be a 
categorical duty to perform action A which is of the fonn of (1). 
Duties of the foml of (1) can also include duties whose fulfillment does not 
require the perfonnance of actions at all. Some basic duties, such as the duty 
not to seize the possessions of another, are fulfilled precisely by refraining from 
seizing the possessions of others. In such circumstances one ought to do whatever 
is necessary to bring about the state of affairs that one does not seize the posses-
sions of others. 
Can there be anything optional in the fulfillment of basic duties? Clearly a 
duty whose fulfillment does not admit of options, i.e., which embodies a rigid 
requirement to perfonn a particular action, is a basic duty. If an airline pilot has 
a duty to press a button activating the safety belt signs whenever the aircraft 
descends below 5,000 feet, then everyone in relevantly similar circumstances 
must clo exactly that-press the button. However, it is not true that every basic 
duty is one which embodies rigid requirements of this sort. George must do 
whatever is necessary to rescue the drowning swimmer, but it is certainly possible 
that George knows two or three equally effective techniques for rescuing drowning 
swimmers. If so, the choice of technique can be optional in the fulfillment of 
George's duty. Generally speaking, the specific actions performed by an agent 
in doing whatever is necessary to bring about outcome 0 need not be dictated 
by the circumstances of the agent. Hence the choice of specific actions can 
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frequently be optional in the fulfillment of basic duties. The duties referred to 
at the outset of the discussion, accordingly, tum out to constitute an important, 
but by no means exhaustive, subclass of basic duties. Nevertheless, in what 
follows I shall suggest that when one begins to consider other ways in which 
the fulfillment of duty is optional, one is led beyond basic duties to countenance 
duties of other types. 
2. Duties of Indeterminate Occasion 
Kant was correct in acknowledging that there are certain duties which agents 
are free to fulfill when they choose to do so. Mill too acknowledged them, and 
it is clear from the following passage in Utilitarianism that their recognition has 
become somewhat common among moral philosophers: 
Now it is known that ethical writers divide moral duties into two classes, 
denoted by the ill-chosen expressions, duties of perfect and of imperfect 
obligation; the latter being those in which, though the act is obligatory, 
the particular occasions of performing it are left to our choice, as in the 
case of charity or beneficence ... 3 
Charity is obligatory, according to Mill, but the particular occasions of performing 
acts of charity is a matter which is optional. 
It is important to see that these "imperfect obligations" cannot qualify as basic 
duties, for they are not binding upon agents whenever they are in circumstances 
of a certain type. One is obliged to perform acts of charity at some time or other, 
but, unlike George, one is not required to act at a specific time. I shall refer to 
duties of this type as 'Duties ofIndeterminate Occasion,' and I shall characterize 
them as duties of the form: 
(2) Every agent ought sometimes (but need not always) do whatever is 
necessary to bring about outcome 0 in circumstances of type C. 
While basic duties, for some particular type of circumstance C, apply to every 
occasion in which moral agents are in C, the same is not true for duties of 
indeterminate occasion. 
The recently paroled inmates of a certain correctional facility, for example, 
might be required to check in at least once per month with the parole officer 
(their release being conditional upon their promising to do so). There is no 
specific day of the month or specific circumstances such that they must carry 
out the duty on that day or in those circumstances. They must simply do whatever 
is necessary to appear before the parole officer on some day or other during the 
course of the month, for as long as their circumstances include participation in 
the parole program. 4 
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There are, moreover, duties of indeterminate occasion which do not involve 
the precise specification of time intervals. Suppose, to slightly alter Mill's exam-
ple, that I promise an administrative representative for a certain charity that I 
will from time to time donate money to it. By making such a promise I have 
presumably created for myself a duty. But what type of duty have I created? 
Since I have made no commitments as to how frequently I will make donations, 
I have created one whose fulfillment will consist in my making occasional 
contributions. 
Unlike George, who has an immediate duty to rescue the drowning person, 
there is no specific occasion such that on that occasion I have a duty to make a 
donation. I simply have a duty on various future occasions, whatever they may 
be, to do whatever is necessary to make a contribution. One of the basic differ-
ences between basic duties and duties of indeterminate occasion, accordingly, 
would seem to be that if an agent has a basic duty, then there is a particular 
occasion (and possibly more than one) such that the agent has a duty to do all 
that is necessary to bring about a certain outcome on that occasion. And if an 
agent has a duty of indeterminate occasion, then there need be no such occasion. 
It might be argued that in the charity example I have a basic duty to do 
whatever is necessary to bring about the following outcome: That I occasionally 
contribute to the charity. I have a duty to bring about this outcome, and this 
duty is binding upon me as long as I remain alive, the charity remains in existence, 
and so 011. It is not a duty which requires me to perform acts of charity on certain 
occasions; it is a duty which requires me, on a continuous basis, to see to it that 
the outcome is brought about. 
In response, I wish to claim that this basic duty is stronger than the duty I 
have described above, and it strikes me as dubious that his basic duty is binding 
upon me. Let 0 be the state of affairs that agent S occasionally brings about 
outcome 0'. If D j is a basic duty to do whatever is necessary to bring about 
outc:ome 0 whenever in circumstances C, and if D2 is a duty occasionally to do 
whatever is necessary to bring about outcome 0' in circumstances C, then it is 
plausible to claim that S has D j only if S has D2 . If S has a duty, on a continuous 
basis, to see to it that S will occasionally bring about 0', then it would seem 
that S has a duty occasionally to bring about 0'. However, the claim that S has 
D2 only if S has DI is a different matter entirely. If S has a duty occasionally 
to bring about 0', there seems no reason at all to conclude that S has a duty, 
on a continuous basis, to see to it that S will occasionally bring about 0'. 
It is not entirely clear what is required of S in order to fulfill D I prior to such 
time as S actually makes a contribution (for example), but suppose we say that 
D j requires S to be in a continuous state of 'monitoring.' This need not, of 
course, be a conscious state of mind or any state of mind at all. But remaining 
in a state of monitoring would seem, at the very least, to preclude one's lapsing 
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into a state of total forgetfulness for an extended period of time of what one 
ought eventually to be doing. If S were to lapse into such a state, then suddenly 
remember the requirement to make a contribution some thirty years later and 
promptly do so, it would be difficult to defend the claim that S had nevertheless 
remained in a state of monitoring and therefore had fulfilled D j . Duty Dz, by 
contrast, does not require anything comparable, and S would in this instance 
have fulfilled Dz. I conclude that D j is stronger than Dz, and I would argue that 
I do not clearly have an ongoing duty in the charity example to bring it about 
that I occasionally contribute money to charity. 
3. Duties of Indeterminate Agency 
All of the duties considered up to this point share a common characteristic: 
They apply to every agent in relevantly similar circumstances if they apply at 
all. It might be tempting to suppose that this characteristic is one which must 
be possessed by all duties. For how, one might ask, can there be a duty which 
applies to some, but not all, persons in relevantly similar circumstances? Philos-
ophers discussing topics such as universalizability sometimes seem to come 
perilously close to endorsing the idea that something can be a duty only if it is 
binding upon every agent in relevantly similar circumstances (if it is binding at 
all). Nevertheless, I shall argue that there are bonafide duties for which this is 
not the case. 
Imagine a situation in which George is joined by a large group of persons, 
each of whom is experienced in the techniques of lifesaving, when a swimmer 
in the process of drowning begins calling for help. If it is apparent that they 
cannot all simultaneously rescue the swimmer and that the optimal situation 
would be if exactly one of them were to rescue the swimmer, then none of the 
persons has a basic duty to rescue the swimmer. For if any of them has a basic 
duty, then each of them has the same basic duty. But surely it is false that each 
of them has a basic duty to do whatever is necessary to rescue the swimmer, 
for it is not within anyone's power to rescue the swimmer if everyone else were 
attempting to do the same. The duty to rescue the swimmer, therefore, is not a 
basic duty. Someone or other in the group ought to do it, but no particular 
member of the group has a basic duty to do it. It is what I shall call a 'Duty of 
Indeterminate Agency,' or, more precisely, a duty of the form: 
(3) Some agent or other (but not every agent) ought to do whatever is 
necessary in order to bring about outcome 0 whenever in 
circumstances of type C. 
One might argue, of course, that although this duty is not a basic duty, there 
are nevertheless basic duties in the neighborhood which are binding upon these 
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persons. There ought to be, for instance, some type of impromptu selection 
process for determining who will perform the rescue, and it is plausible to argue 
that each person has a basic duty to participate in this process, or, in other words, 
to see to it that someone in the group takes action. If one of them were to walk 
away, totally unconcerned over whether the drowning person would be rescued, 
then such a person can reasonably be blamed for the failure to fulfill a duty. 
And the duty which this person has failed to fulfill is a basic duty, for it is one 
which is binding upon each of the persons standing on the beach, and it is one 
which would be binding upon any agent in relevantly similar circumstances. 
Each of these persons, then, has a duty of indeterminate agency to do whatever 
is necessary to bring it about that the swimmer is rescued (for short I shall call 
it a 'rescue duty'). This means that someone or other in the group ought to do 
whatever is necessary to bring this about, even though there is no person in the 
group for whom there is a basic rescue duty. Because this is so, it cannot be 
deduced from the fact that they each have rescue duties of indeterminate agency 
that anyone of them has the following duty: To do whatever is necessary to 
rescue the drowning swimmer in the event that no one else does. Imagine that 
everyone else in the group refuses to get wet until such a time as the water 
temperature has had a chance to reach 65 degrees. Does George now have a 
basic rescue duty? 
I am inclined to think that George does now have a basic rescue duty, but the 
point to be stressed is that his having this basic duty is not entailed by his having 
a rescue duty of indeterminate agency. If he does have such a basic duty, it is 
in virtue of being in a new, altered set of circumstances. To argue that it is 
binding upon him cannot, therefore, rest entirely upon pointing out that he has 
a rescue duty of indeterminate agency. 
Perhaps some will find it counter-intuitive to speak of duties which, although 
they are binding upon every person in a group, fail to require of any specific 
persons in the group that they undertake (or refrain from undertaking) any action. 
However, consider the alternative. To deny that there are such duties would 
force one to affirm that there exists a moral obligation to rescue the drowning 
person when George is alone on the beach, and there exists no moral obligation 
to rescue the same drowning person when George is joined by a group of others 
who are capable of rescuing the person. But it is hard to see how the presence 
of obligation vanishes simply by the addition of potential rescuers. 
One might, it is true, prefer to think of duties of indeterminate agency as 
duties which attach or apply to groups of agents rather than individual agents. 
According to this point of view, George himself cannot properly be said to have 
such a duty; it is a group duty. I do not believe this is the best way to conceive 
of duties of indeterminate agency, but the point to be emphasized is that in some 
manner or other one must account for the presence of obligation in group situations 
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of this kind. And in whatever manner one prefers to think of duties of indeter-
minate agency. it is clear that they accomplish this result. 
Consider another example. One hundred persons who are being imprisoned 
by a group of political terrorists are informed that one of them must volunteer 
to clean out the septic tank. They are informed that if no one volunteers, then 
the terrorists will explode a bomb at a location where it is almost certain to 
injure many innocent people (and they will not do so otherwise). Here I believe 
it is correct to say that somebody ought to volunteer (to prevent the explosion 
of the bomb) but not that each prisoner has a duty to volunteer, nor, for that 
matter, that any particular prisoner has a duty to volunteer. 5 If Betty volunteers 
to clean out the septic tank, thereby preventing the explosion, then it is not at 
all clear that Bonnie, who did not volunteer, can be blamed for having failed to 
fulfill a duty to volunteer. Some prisoner or other ought to volunteer, but it is 
not the case that any particular prisoner ought to volunteer. The duty to volunteer 
is a duty of indeterminate agency. 
Similar results apply if it were demanded that two prisoners volunteer to clean 
out the septic tank. Two prisoners or other ought to volunteer, but it is still false 
to say that each prisoner has a duty to volunteer, or to say of any particular 
prisoner that he or she has a duty to volunteer. It is possible, therefore, that 
there be duties of indeterminate agency which specify that multiple agents fall 
under their scope. They need not, however, specify exactly how many such 
agents fall under their scope. 
4. Duties of Indeterminate Degree 
Duties of indeterminate occasion and duties of indeterminate agency each 
contain an element of what is optional. In the fulfillment of the former it is the 
occasion which is optional; within certain boundaries an agent can choose when 
to discharge the duty. In the fulfillment of the latter it is optional which agent 
or agents, out of those in the same set of relevant circumstances, discharge them. 
Duties of indeterminate degree will now tum out to be those in which it can be 
optional as to the degree or extent to which one's actions contribute to the outcome: 
(4) Every agent ought to do some (but need not do all) of what is 
necessary in order to bring about outcome 0 whenever III 
circumstances of type C. 
Unlike the duties considered in the foregoing sections, duties of indeterminate 
degree do not apply to every portion of the effort necessary to bring about the 
outcome in question. 
Suppose that as the result of our joint efforts you and I manage to steal $100 
from a mutual acquaintance. If each of us has a duty to return the stolen money, 
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then these duties are such that our acquaintance will recover his $100 if and 
when we fulfill them. His recovering the money in full, accordingly, is the 
outcome toward which the fulfillment of our respective duties will contribute. 
But I do not have a duty to bring about this outcome if, as we might imagine, 
you steadfastly refuse to cooperate with my efforts to return the money. Given 
your refusal to cooperate, I cannot fairly be blamed for the failure of our acquain-
tance to recover the full $lOO. I have a duty to do some of what is necessary to 
bring this about, but I do not have a duty to do all of what is necessary to bring 
it about. My duty is a duty of indeterminate degree. It is not clear exactly what 
I must do, whether it be to reason with you, or to simply grab some of the 
money and run, but that is just the point. It is clear that I ought to do something, 
but the degree to which my actions contribute to the outcome is indeterminate. 
If you and I had already split the money, then the situation would be different. 
In such a situation I have a basic duty, not a duty of indeterminate degree. I 
have a duty to return the $50 I pocketed, and hence there is an outcome which 
I ought to do everything necessary to bring about. I have a basic duty, not with 
respect to my acquaintance's recovering his $100, but with respect to his recov-
ering the $50 I pocketed, and my duty is no longer a duty of indeterminate degree. 
Other examples of duties of indeterminate degree are not hard to find. If two 
of us have a duty to load a heavy crate on a truck, and neither of us can load 
it alone, then each of us has a duty of indeterminate degree to get it loaded. But 
there is no particular portion of the crate which falls within the scope of my 
duty and another which falls within the scope of your duty. Rather, each of us 
has a duty to contribute to the loading of the entire crate. 
The same appears to be the case when two of us have a duty to load a large 
number of small cartons on a truck. The degree to which I have a duty to 
contribute to the loading of the cartons is indeterminate. There is no basic duty, 
specifying how many cartons I must load, to which my duty is precisely equiva-
lent. Certainly I have a basic duty to load at least one carton on the truck, but 
the entirety of my duty of indeterminate degree is not exhausted by fulfilling 
this duty. Nor is it evident that my duty is equivalent to a basic duty to load at 
least half the cartons. For if at the end of the afternoon we have loaded them 
all, but I have loaded slightly fewer than you, then it is far from evident that 
you have fulfilled your duty but I have not fulfilled mine. 
Here it seems correct to state that there is no number n such that, necessarily, 
I have fulfilled my duty if and only if I have loaded at least n cartons. The extent 
to which my efforts contribute to the final outcome, therefore, admits of options. 
There are various options, any of which will constitute the fulfillment of my 
duty. My duty, in other words, is not reducible to a basic duty to load at least 
n cartons. 
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5. Other Types of Duties 
Having seen several important ways in which the fulfillment of duty can admit 
of options, it can now be seen that by combining elements of what is optional 
in the foregoing types of duties, it is possible to generate several other types of 
duties: 
(5) Some agents or other (but not every agent) ought sometimes (but 
need not always) do whatever is necessary to bring about outcome 
o in circumstances of type C. 6 
Some duties are sufficiently weak so as to apply only to some persons at some 
times, as when it is required that at least once per month a prisoner volunteer 
to clean the septic tank. 
(6) Every agent ought sometimes (but need not always) do some (but 
need not do all) of what is necessary to bring about outcome 0 in 
circumstances of type C. 
Some duties apply only to some times and only some of what it takes to achieve 
the outcome, as when it is required that every prisoner volunteer at least once 
per month to help load a heavy crate on the truck. 
(7) Some agents or other (but not every agent) ought to do some (but 
need not do all) of what is necessary to bring about outcome 0 
whenever in circumstances of type C. 
Some duties apply only to some persons and only some of what it takes to 
achieve the outcome, as when it is required that two prisoners volunteer to help 
load a heavy crate on the truck whenever the truck returns. 
(8) Some agents or others (but not every agent) ought sometimes (but 
need not always) do some (but need not do all) of what is necessary 
to bring about outcome 0 in circumstances of type C. 
Some duties are so weak that they apply only to some persons, at some times, 
and with respect to only some of what it takes to achieve the outcome, as when 
it is required that some prisoner volunteer at least once per month to load some 
cartons on the truck. If any prisoner loads any cartons on any day of the month, 
then the duty has been fulfilled. 
6. Conclusion 
People are often inclined to think of duties in terms of rigid requirements 
rather than in terms of requirements whose fulfillment admits of options. It seems 
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more natural, for example, to think of duties as requirements to be discharged 
at definite times than as requirements to be discharged, at least to some degree, 
according to one's personal convenience. 7 Thus, it is likely that basic duties 
function for most people as paradigms of duty, and because of this there is a 
potential temptation to overlook duties of other types. Philosophers have long 
since recognized that "Duties of Imperfect Obligation" are likewise genuine 
duties. However, the contention Mill ascribes to "ethical writers," that moral 
duties are either duties of perfect or imperfect obligation, seems to have gone 
almost entirely unchallenged (with the exception of Burchill and perhaps one or 
two others) by contemporary writers. I hope to have shown that there are, in 
addition, duties of indeterminate agency and duties of indeterminate degree, not 
to mention still weaker duties in which these features of indeterminacy are 
combined in various ways. 
Many of the duties which embody God's demands upon His creatures are 
indeed basic duties, but our God-given duties, I believe, go well beyond the 
confines of basic duties. There are important demands God makes of His creatures 
which allow a genuine freedom to choose their means of fulfillment. It is important 
to stress that God often demands of us a certain specific mode of behavior, but 
our God-given duties frequently require us to make responsible choices regarding 
the manner in which we discharge them in our lives." 
Calvin College 
NOTES 
1. Durkheim, Moral Education, p. 55. 
2. Some philosophers might prefer to think of these duties in terms of what agents ought to undertake 
to bring about, but for purposes of simplicity I shall speak of duties in the manner expressed in (1). 
A duty which is an instance of a duty of the form of (1) I shall also regard as a basic duty. 
3. Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 74. It may not be entirely clear what Mill means by the locution, 
'particular occasion,' but for the purposes of this paper I shall assume that a precise criterion has 
been provided for what counts as a particular occasion. 
4. It might be objected that the duty of each paroled inmate in this example is actually a basic duty 
in disguise. Let 'C*' stand for the circumstances of a paroled inmate Sam by virtue of which Sam 
has a duty of indeterminate occasion to check in monthly with the parole officer. Add to C* the 
following two states of affairs: (i) Sam has not yet paid the parole officer a visit this month, and 
(ii) It is now Sam's last opportunity to pay the parole office a visit this month. Let 'C**' stand for 
the resulting expanded set of circumstances. One might then argue that Sam's duty is logically 
equivalent to a basic duty to pay the parole officer a visit whenever in circumstances C**. However, 
even If this argument is successful (and I believe there are good reasons for thinking it is not), it 
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does not apply to examples such as the one described in the next paragraph. 
5. It is compatible with this position, however, to judge that the prisoners share in the responsibility 
for the explosion in the event that no one volunteers. 
6. Lorenne Burchill appears to acknowledge duties of this type in asserting ('In Defense of Saints 
and Heroes,' p. 155) that actions of heroism or sacrifice are actions which "some agents ought to 
do on some occasions." That actions of heroism or sacrifice are duties of this type, however, strikes 
me as mistaken. 
7. Philosophical discussions sometimes seem to reflect this tendency. Actions are said to be 
supererogatory, for example, just in case their performance is both praiseworthy and fulfills no duties 
or obligations. But what types of duties do supererogatory actions fail to fulfill? Discussions of 
supererogation almost invariably leave the impression that the fulfillment of duties of indeterminate 
occasion would have no bearing upon whether a praiseworthy action achieves supererogatory status. 
When an agent performs a praiseworthy action on a given occasion and there is no duty by virtue 
of which the agent is required to perform such an action on that occasion, one seems encouraged 
to conclude that the action is supererogatory. The idea appears to be that one has gone beyond the 
call of duty by performing a praiseworthy action at a time when it was not required to do so. But 
clearly this manner of talking about supererogation is misleading in its simplicity. 
8. I am indebted to Thomas Kennedy, Edward Wierenga, and members of the Calvin College 
Philosophy Department for criticisms of an earlier version of this paper. 
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